T he end of Socialism in Eastern Europe has opened up the opportunity to transform the centrally planned economies into market economies and to integrate Eastern.and Western Europe politically and economically. The transition process within Eastern Europe and the integration process with Western Europe are the focal points of this paper. The paper examines the overlap between transition and integration, sketches briefly the situation in the Eastern European countries with respect to economic transition and to the European integration process, discusses the institutional framework for European integration, describes the Acquis Communautaire and derives some policy conclusions concerning necessary reforms within the Eastern European countries and the EU.
Overlap between Transition and Integration
Transition and reorientation towards Western Europe have been the two decisive challenges for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) since 1989.
1 Whereas in the early 1990s the transition from the central planning system to a market economy was the main goal of economic policies, the requirements for closer integration with the Western European countries have increasingly gained in importance at the end of the 1990s. The overlap between these two processes is represented in Figure 1 .
For the transition process from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy, three main areas of reforms have been identified, namely macroeconomic stabilization, real adjustment at the microeconomic level and creation of an institutional framework.
2 Macroeconomic stabilization seeks to overcome the instabilities relating to the price level, the exchange rate and the state budget, which emerged in many transition economies after the onset of economic reform. The reforms at the microeconomic level aim to establish viable markets through conversion of state conglomerates into separate legal entities (commercialization), privatization of these firms, price liberalization and opening up to international trade. Furthermore, the opportunities for firms to enter into and exit from the market have to be assured. After the establishment of these macro-and microeconomic reforms, prices will tend to mirror world market prices and thus to reflect the costs and the scarcity of goods and factors. However, the allocation of factors and inputs within the firms inherited from the Socialist era may not fully correspond to the new prices both at the input and output level; some output may not be competitive under the new conditions; part of the physical capital stock may have become obsolete; and national and international competition may intensify. Therefore, individual domestic firms and the whole economy experience a transformation "shock".
The reform of the institutional framework has to ensure that a meaningful and beneficial decentralization of economic decisions occurs. The new legal * Kiel Institute of World Economics, Germany. The author is grateful to Jorn Kleinert, Rolf J. Langhammer, Matthias Lucke, Horst Siebert and Katrin Springer for many valuable comments. Financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1 In this paper the term "CEECs" covers the ten Eastern European countries who have opened negotiations on membership of the European Union. In March 1998 negotiations started between the EU on the one hand and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (plus Cyprus) on the other hand. In February 2000 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (plus Malta) also began negotiations on EU accession. foundation has to establish and enforce private property rights, a viable law of contract and a law of enterprises. Furthermore, the responsibilities of monetary policy and financial intermediation have to be separated through the establishment of a two-tier banking system. Finally, the independence of the central bank has to be guaranteed in order to ensure macroeconomic stabilization. 3 These three areas of reforms are interdependent in the sense that success in one area will be attained only if sufficient progress is made in the other two. Furthermore, simultaneous progress in all these areas is also required to gain credibility for economic reforms.
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Figure 1 Areas and Sequence of Reforms for the Advanced European Transition Countries
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. The requirements for the accession of the CEECs to the European Union also fall into these three main areas of necessary reforms for transition. The European Council, at its meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, defined three criteria which applicants would have to fulfill before accession: 5 D the political criterion: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,
• the economic criterion: existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union,
• the criterion concerning the adoption of the acquis communautaire (see below): ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
Whereas the second Copenhagen criterion addresses the reforms necessary at a microeconomic level (as indicated in Figure 1 ), the third criterion covers the 3 H. Siebert: The World Economy, Routledge, Cambridge 1999. 4 The link between institutional reforms and economic growth as well as the progress in transition towards a market economy in 25 transition countries is discussed more closely in D. Piazolo: Growth Effects of Institutional Change and European Integration, in: Economic Systems, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp. 305-330 . A more fundamental description of the overall societal effects of the transition from socialism to capitalism is offered by J. Kornai: What the Change of Systems from Socialism to Capitalism does and does not mean, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 27-42. institutional framework and macroeconomic stabilization. In the primary objective concerning the rule of law, the first Copenhagen criterion is also targeted toward institutional capacity-building. Consequently, there is a considerable overlap between the requirements for transition in the CEECs on the one hand and for the integration with Western Europe on the other.
Economic Disparities Still Huge
Economic disparities between _the EU and the candidate countries were still huge by the end of the 1990s as is shown in Table 1 . The table provides data for the aggregate of the 15 present EU members (labeled EU15), the ten transition countries that have applied for membership (the dates of application are given in Table 3 ) and for three other applicants (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey).
The economic size of the candidates for EU membership is small compared to the EU15. Poland, the largest transition country likely to join the EU, has an economic size of less than 2 percent of the EU15. All the other transition countries with candidate status have an economic size of less than 1 percent of the EU15. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the inhabitants of the candidate transition countries achieve between 7 (Bulgaria) and 44 percent (Slovenia) of the EU15 average. The difference in development is, however, better represented by the data on the per capita GDP at purchasing power parity. According to this measure, GDP per capita in the ten transition countries ranges from 23 percent of the EU15 average for Bulgaria to 68 percent for Slovenia. How far the candidate countries are from the EU15 is also underlined by the disparity of sectoral composition of GDP indicated in Table 1 . Whereas agriculture accounts for only 2.3 percent of GDP and 5.2 percent of total employment in the EU15 )5 ,this sector contributes between 3.9 (Slovenia) and 21.1 percent (Bulgaria) to GDP and between 5.5 (Czech Republic) and 40 percent (Romania) to overall employment. The service sector contributes 67 percent of GDP in EU15, but only 41.7 percent in Romania and 53.7 percent in the Czech Republic. The share.of the sector "industry and construction" in most transition countries is higher than in the EU. The EU15 has on average an industrial sector accounting for 30.7 percent of gross value added. Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia have a larger industrial sector than the EU and the Czech Republic and Romania even have an industrial sector accounting for more than 40 percent of GDP.
This structure is the legacy of the centrally planned economy. The central planners had a pronounced preference for (heavy) industry while disregarding and even discriminating against the tertiary sector. According to Gros and Suhrcke, this characteristic would -even after ten years of transition -allow an economist without any access to time series data to distinguish the previously centrally planned economies from all other countries in the world. 6 The preeminent importance of the EU15 as a trading partner for the candidate countries is also
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Methods for Strategic Environmental Assessment of Transport Infrastructure Plans Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is introduced as a new instrument of environmental policy in European legislation. Therefore, methods and tools are developed in this work which support an environmentally sustainable design of large-scale transport plans. 2000, 248 S., brosch., 79-DM, 577-oS, 72-sFr, ISBN3-7890-6768-7 1 Data provided by Cyprus refer to the Government controlled part only, with the exception of data on area which refer to the whole of Cyprus.
2 GDP is expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS)
to enable correct comparison of volume of goods and services produced by different countries. of the EU in total exports or total imports is near or above 60 percent, which represents a marked change from the pre-1989 trade pattern.
:
Institutional Framework for Integration
The so-called Europe Agreements were initiated in the early 1990s to provide a framework for the gradual economic and political integration of the CEECs with the present EU members. The first two Europe Agreements were signed by Poland and Hungary in December 1991 and entered into force in February 1994, as shown in Table 2 . The other eight CEECs have also signed Europe Agreements with the EU, and the last Europe Agreement (with Slovenia) entered into force in February 1999. The Europe Agreements aim for full EU membership in the long run and provide for reductions in trade barriers, co-operation in the economic, financial, technical and cultural fields, and a forum for political dialogue. 7 In that respect, the Europe Agreements go beyond bilateral free trade agreements and are, consequently, the most far-reaching agreements that the EU has ever signed with third countries.
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In order to bridge the period until the Europe' Agreements entered into force, the EU agreed upon Interim Agreements with the six first CEEC signatories and upon Free Trade Agreements with the. other four CEECs. These temporary agreements expired with the establishment of the validity of the Europe Agreements (see Table 2 ). With the Interim Agreements entering into force, customs duties' applicable to imports into the EU were eliminated for manufactured goods from the CEECs involved. In January 1994 and in January 1995 most residual duties on sensitive goods were deleted. • 9
Poland has.been granted an exception for certain products of the car industry, allowing the gradual reduction of the tariffs over a longer time period. Similarly, Hungary has obtained an exception for steel products (cf. European Commission, ibid.).
with the CEECs reducing trade barriers more slowly than the EU. The CEECs were allowed to keep tariffs for a restricted list of manufactured products from the EU when the Interim or Free Trade Agreements entered into force, but had to gradually reduce these tariffs according to a preset timetable! By January 2000, virtually all industrial exports from the EU to the CEECs were duty-free.
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The Europe Agreements also contain specific arrangements for sensitive industries. In the textiles sector the EU eliminated duties on imports from the CEECs in. January 1997 and all quantitative restrictions in January 1998. The CEECs progressively reduced their tariffs for imports of textiles from the EU until January 2000. The Agreements also established gradual liberalization for farm products, processed farm goods and fisheries for trade between the EU and the CEECs, with January 2002 scheduled as the date when all tariffs and quantitative restrictions have to be eliminated. Furthermore, the Europe Agreements entitled the contracting parties to take emergency measures only in specified exceptionarcases and allowed under certain restricted circumstances the use of anti-dumping measures under the terms established by the World Trade Organization.
As mentioned above, the Europe Agreements were signed with the intention of full EU membership for the CEECs. Consequently, it is very difficult to distinguish between the effects of the Europe Agreements per se and the incremental consequences of full EU membership. Through regional integration with Western Europe as embodied in the Europe Agreements and EU membership, the CEECs will join the world's largest individual market.
Through accession to the EU, the Eastern European countries will also accept the common external tariffs of the EU, which are often lower than the present tariffs imposed on their imports from third countries, i. Insights concerning some likely aspects of the eastern enlargement process of the EU can be drawn from the previous enlargement rounds. Table 3 represents the timetable for the four previous enlargement rounds integrating nine new members, also with the dates of application and the issuing of Whereas domestic politics determine a country's decision of whether to apply for EU membership, the timing is also influenced by the state of other applications. Despite the fact that in principle the equality of all applicants is emphasized in the negotiations procedures, a clustering of countries does tend to occur. The application and accession of Denmark and Ireland was determined by the situation concerning the UK. Portugal's application and accession was effectively linked to that of Spain. Furthermore, it has been claimed that the early application of Austria induced a quicker application by the Scandinavian countries because of the joint EFTA link.
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-As an exception, Greece was able to disconnect itself, from the other two Mediterranean applicants. Since the accession of new countries has to be ratified by all EU members in a time-consuming procedure, the clustering of East European countries that has materialized during the opening stage of negotiations is likely to remain relevant for the actual accession.
The four previous enlargement rounds permit a typical enlargement procedure to be identified. At the beginning of negotiations the main outcome is already clear: the integration of new members into a club with the inherited regulatory system of the old members. Thus, the negotiations are not about a future pact between equal partners with both partners having to modify their rules of behavior, but solely about how and when the smaller partner will implement the rules of the larger partner. In fact, these are negotiations on temporary exemptions from the rules, not negotiations on the rules themselves. This approach embodies serious shortcomings which might become quite perilous in future Eastern enlargements.
14 Acceding members have an incentive to conclude negotiations quickly and to solve any outstanding disagreements after being granted full membership with decision-making and voting rights. Since the political decision-making process within such a European Union would slow down considerably, it is clear that comprehensive reforms are necessary. An Intergovernmental Conference started work in February 2000' on the task of reforming the political decision-making process and the Amsterdam Treaty, the latest EU treaty, that entered into force in May 1999. One very likely reform step concerns a cap on the number of seats in the European Parliament at the level of 700. Furthermore, it is likely that for decisions in the Council of Ministers a majority of the votes will also have to represent a majority of the European population in order to be decisive.
The Acquis Communautaire
Countries acceding to the EU are required to adopt the acquis communautaire, which represents the established institutional and regulatory framework with respect to European integration. A country acceding to the EU is obliged to accept and effectively implement the entirety of the acquis as it has evolved until the date of membership to the Union. The acquis consists of • legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties, and the case law of the Court of Justice;
• statements and resolutions adopted within the EU framework;
• joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within the framework of the common foreign and security policy;
• joint actions, joint positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs; 10  10  10  10  8  5  5  5  5  4  4  3  3  3  2  87  10  8  6  5  5  4  3  3  3  3  3  2  2  144 Commissioners • international agreements concluded by the EU and those concluded among themselves by the member states with regard to Union activities.
15
Generally, no derogation from the acquis is permitted. In certain circumstances temporary exemption may be permitted to grant the acceding country transitional periods for the progressive adoption of the acquis in areas with extraordinary difficulty. The overall aim of the present EU, however, is the adoption of the complete acquis by the acceding country. The precedent for this approach was set when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Community. In order to ensure that the acceding countries shared the same status, privileges, rights and obligations as existing members, the acceding countries had to adopt all that had been achieved with respect to European integration. The desire to avoid "acquis-picking", where countries choose the easy elements from the European integration menu, or the situation of a multi-speed Europe, induced the insistence on the implementation of the entirety of the acquis by the new members.
This approach, however, contains the danger of an ever increasing gap between the contents of the acquis and the requirements of the various member states. The acquis has grown to include an increasing numbers of treaties, rules and regulations as well as various joint projects. The acquis consists now of about 80,000 pages, that have been grouped in various chapters for the negotiation talks as represented in Table 5 .
Both the number and the diversity of member states have also increased since the first enlargement and will rise considerably with eastern enlargement. The members of an EU with more than 20 states will have to cope with increasingly different problems. Consequently, the processes of deepening and widening the EU will continually grow in difficulty. The policy conclusions at the end of this paper show that an enlarged EU will require provisions that allow a subset of members the flexibility to advance further integration without extending automatically the acquis which would make future enlargement rounds even harder. For a Union with more than 20 countries, deepening and widening at the same time appears to be feasible only within a multi-speed Europe. For the presently negotiating candidates, the complexities of the present acquis require a close examination to determine which parts should be implemented immediately, which parts should be postponed until full membership and for which parts transition periods after EU membership should be negotiated.
Even if it is arguable whether the acquis constitutes the best institutional framework for the transition countries due to the existing development gap relative to the current EU members, it is likely that the acquis will stabilize the continuing political and economic reform process by setting clear targets for institutionbuilding.
Due to its enormous size and complexity, the implementation of the acquis also creates a considerable adjustment burden for the acceding countries. The open conflict between the EU and Poland concerning the acquis chapter "agriculture" in early 2000 indicates that the complete integration of the CEECs into the EU will involve substantial friction and will take several years. For example, the Polish negotiators regard it as absolutely necessary that local producers can sell within Poland meat and milk products that do not fulfill the high EU hygiene standards for several years after EU membership. Further friction to the negotiations about the acquis is added through the disagreements about the CEECs' access to the structural funds and to the direct transfer payments to farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy as well as about the transition periods for the free movement of persons.
In the European Commission's latest annual reports 17 on the CEECs' progress towards accession, it is pointed out that only Hungary and the Czech Republic have advanced in the adoption of the EU framework concerning technical standards and certification whereas the other CEECs feature distinct deficits. Additionally, environmental and social standards are being aligned only slowly in all CEECs. Thus, it is unlikely that the CEECs will be able to ensure that most firms in their countries can fulfill the EU norms and standards within three to five years. Furthermore, the CEECs can not yet completely fulfill the Copenhagen economic criterion of the existence of a functioning market economy and the ability to stand up to the competitive forces within the EU.
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Consequently, the CEECs have to muster refreshed verve to advance substantially on their reform path.
Accession Dates
The problems with the CEECs' limited capacity to compete within the EU and with the adoption of the acquis point to the necessity of either delayed accession by the first CEECs (in or after the year 2006) or long transition periods in many areas after an early EU membership (in the year 2003 The integration of eight Eastern European countries plus two Mediterranean countries at the same time might sound like an impossible task, but the overall population of these ten countries (75 million) is smaller than the population of Germany alone (82 million). In this perspective the task of a comprehensive enlargement seems to be manageable. Nevertheless, the full integration of these ten countries into the institutional and administrative framework of the EU will require considerable time. Consequently, the EU will need a certain period for internal consolidation before a further enlargement is feasible. Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Croatia and maybe other successor republics of the former Yugoslavia, are unlikely to be able to accede to the EU before the year 2012.
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This likelihood of delayed EU accession by the CEECs and the existence of beneficial effects from increased credibility due to regional integration indicate the necessity of finding means to bridge the transitional period until full membership without foregoing the credibility import into the CEECs resulting from the EU accession process. Ambiguity about the date of membership might weaken the reform process in Eastern Europe. To overcome this uncertainty an early commitment by the EU to a guaranteed accession in, for instance, 2006 will be necessary. A more desirable, but more improbable alternative would be early EU membership (i.e. in the year 2003) with transition periods for various areas until full compliance with the acquis is achieved. Such an early membership would erase the last doubts about the likelihood of success for the reform process within the advanced CEECs and would give a sizable boost to their economies through the reduction in uncertainty and the corresponding risk premium for investments. However, such an early enlargement would also require a modified self-concept of the entity EU, which is unlikely to evolve quickly.
Increase in Flexibility within the EU
The prospect of a European Union of 25 or more members raises doubts as to whether the desire to promote enlargement and deepening simultaneously can be fulfilled in the future. The depth of integration among the present 15 members, as characterized by the 80,000 page volume of the acquis, can only be transferred and implemented with considerable investment of resources and time. Since the members of an enlarged EU possess quite heterogeneous economies with huge income differences (recall that e.g. Poland has a GDP per capita, at purchasing power parity, of only 39 percent of the EU averagesee Table 1 ), it becomes harder to ensure an appropriate fit of advanced common EU legislation. The expanding membership requires substantial reforms to establish viable and growth-enhancing institutions for the future.
To reduce the danger of a standstill within European integration after the first eastern enlargement round, increased flexibility for further integration schemes of a subset of EU members will be necessary. A Union of various speeds of integration does not imply a permanent segregation into fixed groups within the EU, but the opportunity to promote the further integration of a -at first -smaller group of EU states within the established EU framework and thereby under the control and legitimacy of the European Parliament. Initiatives like the Schengen Agreement for the abolition of border controls by a subgroup of members could then originate within the scope of EU institutions.
20 Parallel to such a provision for increased cooperation among a subset of members, it would be necessary to restrict the general rule that joint actions are only possible with the approval of all members.
The Treaty of Amsterdam contains the "Benelux" clause (Article 306) that endorses arrangements among Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, if the objectives of these arrangements are not met by the Treaty of Amsterdam. In this respect, the present institutional framework of the "EU already contains provisions for further cooperation among some members. A suspension of the geographical constraint would allow the extension of this possibility for further integration in an enlarged EU.
Conclusions
As the article has shown, there is a considerable overlap between the reforms necessary during the transition from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy and the reforms required to join the European Union. Consequently, the advanced transition countries will complete their transition with the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the established institutional and regular framework of the EU. However, the CEECs are not yet fully capable of standing up to the market forces within the EU and adopting all the obligations of EU membership as set out in the acquis. The CEECs still have to complete quite substantial reform tasks.
Since the beginning of the transition, the anticipation of EU membership has helped the CEECs to progress with their reforms. The prospect of uncertain or rather late EU accession due to delayed EU amendments by the present members might jeopardize the zeal and the endeavors for reforms in the CEECs. In this respect, the present EU members can encourage the ongoing reform process within Eastern Europe by quickly establishing flexible EU institutions that are fit for enlargement and by giving the CEECs assurance of certain and early membership. A clear date for EU membership as well as viable, reformed EU institutions would give a boost to the reform process in the CEECs. The present EU members will also benefit from the already advanced economic integration and interdependence between Eastern and Western Europe. 20 The Schengen Agreement was signed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany in June 1985 to simplify travel between them with the main aim of the elimination of all internal border checks onboth people and goods. Italy joined the Schengen Agreement in November 1990; Spain and Portugal in June 1991; Greece in November 1992; Austria in April 1995; Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland in December 1996. Only in June 1997 was the Schengen Agreement incorporated into the EU with the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Ireland and the UK decided to maintain their own border checks and did not join the Schengen Agreement. A special cooperation arrangement was concluded with the two non-EU member states Norway and Iceland.
